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Abstract 
This report describes the adoption and extension of “availability payment” 
concepts currently in use for civil infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to 
contract design and pricing for Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) contracts. 
Availability payment models for civil infrastructure PPPs require the private sector to 
take responsibility for designing, building, financing, operating and maintaining an 
asset (most commonly 
highways). Under the “availability payment” concept, once the asset is 
available for use, the private sector begins receiving an annual payment for a 
contracted number of years based on meeting performance requirements.  The 
challenge in PPPs is to determine a payment plan (amount              and length of 
time) that protects the public interest, i.e., does not overpay the private sector, but 
also minimizes that risk that the asset will become unsupported. In this report we 
focus on availability as the key required outcome and introduce a stochastic 
availability requirement into PBL contract structures. 
The model developed in this report uses an affine controller to drive a discrete 
event simulator (Petri net) that produces availability and cost measures. The model 
is used to explore the optimum availability assessment window (length of time over 
which availability should be assessed) for a PBL contract. 
Keywords: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), contract, pricing, 
Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) 
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A New “Availability-Payment” Model for 
Pricing Performance-Based Logistics 
Contracts 
Introduction 
Acquisition process efficiency and success across a system’s life cycle 
requires the development and implementation of best-value, long-term, outcome-
based product support strategies that leverage performance-based agreements with 
both industry and government product support providers (Kobren, 2011). This is 
reflected in DoD Directive 5000.01, Enclosure 1, Paragraph E1.1.29 that states, 
“The Program Manager (PM) shall be the single point of accountability for 
accomplishing program objectives for total life-cycle systems management, including 
sustainment, survivability, safety, and affordability. 
PMs shall consider supportability, life cycle costs, performance, and schedule 
comparable in making program decisions. Planning for Operation and Support and 
the estimation of total ownership costs shall begin as early as possible. 
Supportability, a key component of performance, shall be considered throughout the 
system life cycle.”  Popular vehicles for accomplishing this directive are 
performance- based product support arrangements. 
Performance-based logistics (PBL) and similar mechanisms have become 
popular for contracting the sustainment of military systems in the United States and 
Europe. Performance-based logistics (also referred to as performance-based life-
cycle product support) refers to a group of strategies for system support that instead 
of contracting for goods and services, a contractor delivers performance outcomes 
as defined by performance metric(s) for a system or product (Gansler et al., 2011). 
PBL thinking is reflected in a famous quote from Theodore Levitt (Levitt, 1972): “The 
customer really doesn’t want a drilling machine, he wants a hole-in-the-wall.” PBL 
and similar outcome-based contracts pay for effectiveness (availability, readiness 
and/or other related performance measures) at a fixed rate, penalize performance 
shortcomings, and/or award gains beyond target goals. Under PBL, the contractor 
(system supporter) often commits to providing the current performance level at a 
lower cost, or an increased performance at a cost similar to that previously achieved 
under a non-PBL approach. 
PBL has become the US DoD’s preferred support strategy for weapons 
systems. PBL contracts are normally executed at three levels: component-level, 
subsystem-level, and system or platform -level. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 1 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Subsystem-level contracts are the most prevalent form of PBL. In a 
subsystem-level PBL contract, a contractor is tasked with sustaining a subsystem 
over a period of 5-10 years – often the subsystem has previously been supported via 
a non-PBL contract. 
Many of today’s PBL contracts use what is referred to as public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). In a subsystem PBL a PPP could mean that the contractor 
partners with a government owned and staffed maintenance facility. The contractor 
brings in their best practices and manages the facility, and the contractor is 
responsible for the outcome. In this work we explore the adaptation of a PPP model 
from the civil infrastructure discipline for PBL contact pricing. PPPs in the civil 
infrastructure area (e.g., highway construction and support) have a different 
structure than those traditionally used in PBL. Civil infrastructure PPPs require the 
private sector to take responsibility for designing, building, financing, operating and 
maintaining an asset, which is a much broader view than today’s subsystem PBL 
PPPs in use in the US Department of Defense. 
A significant challenge with PBL contracts is to determine the contract 
requirements and price that protects the public interest, i.e., does not overpay the 
private sector, but also minimizes that risk that the asset will become unsupported. 
Subsystem PBL contracts are generally priced based on: 1) estimating how many 
units will need repair, 2) how much it will cost for each repair, and 3) how the 
number of units requiring repair and/or the repair cost will decrease over time as a 
result of design and/or maintenance improvements made by the contractor. If 
greater than projected improvements are realized the money saved is shared with 
the contractor according to a schedule negotiated in the contract (“gain share”). 
Meeting or exceeding target performance may also allow the contractor to 
add additional years to the contract (“award term”). With subsystem PBL contacts, it 
is reasonably straightforward for the customer  to demonstrate a benefit by 
determining what it would cost to support the system doing business as usual (no 
improvements, non-PBL contract) compared to the cost of a PBL contract, e.g., often 
pre-PBL support and performance experience exists. However, for new system 
acquisition, where there is no sustainment history; and for platform-level PBL, the 
PBL contract pricing problem is much more complex and it is unclear how to 
optimally apply PBL contract mechanisms. For example, a recent study of PBL 
effectiveness (Boyce and Banghart, 2012), reported on the cost of 21 PBL contracts 
where in 9 out of 9 component and subsystem-level PBL contracts the cost 
decreased, but for platform-level (called system- level by Boyce and Banghart) PBL 
6 out of 12 contracts resulted in either cost increases or indeterminable cost 
changes. 
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Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
Before addressing how civil infrastructure PPPs can be applied to PBL, we 
need to briefly describe how PPPs and availability payment mechanisms work in the 
civil infrastructure world (most commonly for the construction and support of 
highways). Due to a growing demand for better infrastructure and insufficient federal 
funds, PPPs are increasingly used in transportation infrastructure development. A 
PPP in civil infrastructure field can be broadly defined as a long-term agreement 
between public and private sectors for mutual benefit (USDOT, 2004). This 
agreement generally defines mutually accepted performance outcomes or results for 
infrastructure assets rather than providing detailed descriptions of the materials, 
equipment, and level of workmanship. The practice in the transportation industry 
shows that the PPP approach enables the public sector to transfer responsibilities 
and risks that can be  efficiently managed by the private sector while retaining the 
risks that can be better managed by the public sector. The payment mechanisms 
used in PPP contracts are classified into two categories: toll based approach (user 
fee) and performance-based non-toll based approach. Tolling allows the private 
sector to collect tolls and to bear the risk associated with low throughput. In projects 
where tolling is not a suitable option non-tolling mechanisms, or typically called 
Availability Payment, can be used. 
An Availability Payment mechanism is a performance-based infrastructure 
procurement where the private sector’s reimbursement is coupled to performance 
specifications. The private sector becomes eligible to receive predetermined 
payments called Maximum Availability Payments (MAPs) only when the asset is fully 
operational. If during the operations, the private sector fails to keep the infrastructure 
available physically or qualitative, appropriate deductions (or penalties) are applied 
and thus the private sector receives adjusted project payments. An Availability 
Payment mechanism requires the private sector to perform and comply with the 
performance standards set in the contract. The performance standards can require 
the physical availability of the asset (for example: open highway lanes) and the 
quality of services of the asset (for example, peak hour throughput, adequate 
lighting, and pavement serviceability). 
Comparison of PBL and PPPs 
PBL and Availability Payment PPPs share many inherent characteristics. In 
both cases the public and private sector objectives are aligned towards ensuring 
better value for the end users/public. These contracts are long term in nature and 
demand the private sector to play a major role in meeting the objectives of the 
system or project. The private sector bears the majority of project or system risks 
and is encouraged to pursue innovative processes and methods. Table 1 
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summarizes the similarity and difference between these contracts. Although the 
procurement contracts are operated by different public agencies and targeted on 
different assets, they all must be well-designed and priced to ensure adequate 
protection of public interest. In the defense industry, the challenge becomes much 
greater considering the complexity and uncertainty of defense acquisition programs. 
While current practices may be effective at the component and subsystem levels, 
pricing a PBL contract becomes more difficult for a new system acquisition where 
prior estimates of any kind are unavailable. Therefore, developing and introducing 
innovative methods and best practices in civil infrastructure PPPs have great 
potential to significantly improve DoD PBL contract acquisition. 
Model Development 
This section adapts and extends “availability payment” concepts currently in 
use for civil infrastructure PPPs to contract design and pricing for PBL contracts. The 
model development explores and demonstrates the merit of the civil infrastructure 
PPP approach for platform-level PBL and new acquisition subsystem PBL contracts. 
We have focused on availability as the key required outcome and introduce a 
stochastic and layered availability requirement into the proposed civil infrastructure 
PPP based PBL contract structure. 
There are several approaches that can be used to simulate the contractual 
process along the sustainment work flow. Emulating reality in detail and deriving the 
optimum strategies are two necessary activities for developing the best contract 
requirements. Existing methods can be classified into two groups: 1) addressing 
events within the system (event-based); and 2) the dynamical behavior of the 
system (time-based)  
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Table 1. Mapping of Availability Payment Contracts to PBL Contracts 
 DoD PBL Contracts Availability Payment PPP Contracts 
Performance Availability, Reliability, Downtime, 
Outcome, Variances from Goals 
Physical and qualitative availability, 
Serviceability, Resilience, and others 
Incentive Contractor rewarded for performance 
exceeding expectations 
Typically not used; in some cases, 
incentives are used for qualify materials 
up to 5% of total construction cost 
Penalty Penalized for not meeting performance 
criteria and non-availability 
Penalized for not meeting performance 
criteria and non-availability 
Pricing Bidding Engineer Estimate and Bidding 
Value for 
Money 
Benchmarking—compare to non-PBL 
contracts; Market Research 
Value for Money analysis to consider 
unique characteristics of infrastructure 
project 
Contract Term Medium to Long-term (5 year base 
contract followed by a 5 year extension)-- 
Duration based on regulations 
Long-term (Minimum 10 year and 
maximum 99 years), duration based on 
the value for money analysis 
Renegotiation Allowed and possible May be Allowed 
Integration of an event-based system with a time-synchronous system for 
simulation is being pursued in this activity. It should be noted that this area of 
research is not well developed and there are few existing works on synchronization 
of time-based and event-based methods. The outcome-based orientation of our 
problem places more emphasis on selecting the proper time frames to evaluate the 
performance. Meanwhile the nature of reliability and maintenance actions are 
generally event based. 
The goal of the analysis approach is to maintain the preparedness of the 
system, which translates into insuring a minimum level of availability at all times. For 
the support of a fielded system this requires management of parts in such a way as 
to minimize the backorder and holding (inventory position), which will ideally be 
close to zero after responding to demands in each period. The model involves the 
integration of the event-based structure (demand generation) with a time-based 
controller, Figure 1. The time-based controller uses the historical demand data in 
equal periods of time to determine new order sizes. Demands are generated by a 
discrete event simulator that simulates the behavior of the system in time. 
As Figure 1 shows, the architecture of the analysis approach is based upon a 
discrete event retranslation of the process, however the controller only 
communicates with this model in a time-based regime. Also the performance 
measurement of the system is a separate activity that considers each simulation 
path and feeds the controller with a different objective function based on the 
situation. 
The selection of a demand distribution is of great importance. In civil 
infrastructure (highway management) the demand is selected to represent the 
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condition of pavement or roads, which generally has a slow dynamic, while for 
operational purposes systems under PBL contracts consist of parts with a variety of 
failure rates. Modeling the demand distribution for design purposes has a direct 
effect on the optimality of the result. 
The availability and several cost factors are chosen as the parameters that 
the controller needs to control. The demand distribution is derived from the 
reliability of the parts and the controller action orders new parts for replacement. 
Control action is defined as an affine function1, in which we are using previous 
demands to estimate the new order. Making the control action affine makes 
comparison of different control policies that can be described by affine functions 
straightforward, e.g., Model Predictive Controller or Greedy Algorithms. These are 
common methodologies that use demand forecasting for planning future inventory 
support. The controller builds a model from a number of samples in the past and then 
predicts the next demand and the analysis window moves forward in time as more 
information is gathered. 
 
Figure 1. Model Integration Architecture 
Discrete Event Simulation (DES) 
Because of the complexity and stochastic nature of real world applications, 
developing mathematical models of the system under study is far from trivial and 
assessment of their performance is equally difficult. Models that are accurate enough 
1 Affine in the context of nonlinear systems means the control appears linearly (where the nonlinearity with respect 
to the state is automatically implied). 
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to adequately represent system behavior often cannot be analyzed using, for 
example, methods based on the theory of continuous-time Markov chains on a fi nite 
or countable infi nite state space. DES is capable of representing the timeline of the 
life of different parts and subsystems with fewer restrictions. 
One can add any number of variables and parameters to the model without 
the need to change the structure of model. DES provides a visual indication of what 
happens to the fleet and each socket. Most importantly, this model provides a 
probabilistic sensitivity analysis. 
DES has the ability to indicate how a supply chain performs and behaves over 
time when different rules and policies are applied. Testing different scenarios by 
adjusting parameters and procedures means that supply chain performance and 
behavior can be explored. 
We use a DES model of the platform including its maintenance and we test the 
controller performance for the system. The parts in this system go from operational to 
faulty and then based on the availability requirements at any specific time they will be 
selected for maintenance or replacement. Also a model of the inventory is provided 
within the same scheme and different performance measures can be extracted from 
this model. 
Petri nets are a DES approach developed for capturing concurrency and 
synchronization properties. Petri nets are graphical representations and 
mathematical tools for formal specification of complex systems (Haas and Shedler, 
1986). Formal models like Petri net models have a number of advantages over 
simply writing simulation codes or DESs. They can be   easily and automatically 
verified for deadlocks, conflict of conditions, catastrophic states, and logical errors in 
reliability-based design projects (Bertolini et al., 2006). 
Figure 2 shows the graphical representation of the maintenance network 
connected to the inventory and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) used in this 
report. The input to the Petri net in Figure 2 is the parts inventory (and inventory 
policies, e.g., reorder threshold, order size, etc.). The net generates maintenance 
demands via sampling failure distributions for the system’s parts and uses the 
inventory to support the system’s maintenance requests. The net produces a time 
series (and cost) of the system’s failure, maintenance, and operation. 
The operation of the net is described as follows. After a failure event, if the 
availability is below the requirement (defined by an operational availability 
constraint), the part is replaced. This assumes that replacement time is always less 
than repair time. After replacement, the system will be available immediately, i.e., 
the inventory lead time is considered in the inventory model. As an order arrives 
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(caused by a replacement event) a new part from inventory is needed. If the 
inventory level goes below a certain level, it will be replenished up to a certain level. 
The inventory is connected to the manufacturer so each delivery from the 
manufacturer can have a different reliability. After the failure event the part goes for 
repair if the availability exceeds the required availability (at this instant in time). 
Downtime of the system increases and a new availability is calculated after repair. 
Good-as-new repair is assumed throughout the analysis. 
 
Figure 2. Petri Net Representation of the System 
Performance Measurement 
The customer’s goals can be described by variety of system outcomes or 
functions of them that we call performance factors. The performance factors are 
generally defined by the contract terms, and observable contractor decisions 
(control parameters in the model) or outcomes of the contractor’s actions. However, 
in some cases the customer needs to measure and define secondary functions of 
these parameters (e.g., operational availability as the ratio of uptime to total 
operational time, and the ratio of inventory to back-log). Based on the performance 
factors used by the customer, different measurements and calculations need to be 
done with the outputs from the DES model (Doerr et al., 2004).2 
The availability as a function of uptime and the total operational time is a 
popular measure of system preparedness. By measuring availability of different 
2 Note, these functions can increase the complexity to the contractor and can also be “gamed,” which means they 
can be satisfied in ways that do not guarantee the achievement of the performance-based contract 
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parts and subsystems we can directly determine the availability of the whole 
systems. This makes the availability the most important factor for measuring 
performance of contractors to support complex platforms (Cuthbertson and 
Piotrowicz, 2011). Due to the accumulative nature of availability (how it is 
accumulated along the timeline), we also need to look for the role of the time 
assessment window in the measurement system (Figure 3).3  Figure 3 depicts how 
the total operational time is divided into equal availability assessment windows. As 
an example, quarterly assessment and bimonthly assessment for a one operational 
year contract is shown. The on-demand time is the time that the customer actually 
needs the system and the preparedness or availability of system is critical, whereas 
the out of demand times are the times that customer does not require the availability 
of the system. During out of demand times the system may or may not be available, 
but its unavailability will not count against the hours that the contract requires the 
contractor to support the system. These are the time periods in which maintenance 
can be done without damaging availability score (so-called scheduled maintenance 
periods). The contractor’s performance is measured in milestones throughout the 
contract length by assessing the performance only over the operational time. Longer 
assessment windows (larger assessment window size) will result in fewer 
assessments (T) during the contract duration. But, if the time assessment window is 
too long, then contractor’s actions near the end of the window will have little impact 
on the availability measurement (contractors will be inclined to “drop the ball” late in 
the window because nothing they do will change the result). Alternatively, if 
windows are too short, contractors are penalized for the initial condition of the 
system and the inventory. Alternatively stated, the size of the assessment window 
will determine the sensitivity of contractor performance actions to different 
interruptions and eventually affect the contractor’s risk-taking attitude. 
Optimization of the assessment window size is a primary goal of the model 
discussed in this report. Also, each availability assessment has an associated 
customer cost of performing the assessment, i.e., assessing the contractor’s 
performance is not free. This can be administrative cost or the tasks of evaluating 
the level of availability in more complex parts of the system. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assumed that regardless of length of the assessment window, the cost 
of all assessments to the customer are the same. 
3 The time assessment window refers to the period of time over which the availability is assessed, e.g., monthly, 
quarterly, annually, etc.; the model assumes that all assessment windows are the same length. 
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Controller Mechanism (The Ordering/Planning Strategy) 
 
Figure 3. The Contractor’s Performance Measured in Milestones 
Throughout the Contract Length by Assessing the Performance 
Over the Operational Time 
Special attention was paid to exploring the decision making process, and 
building the corresponding two-level stochastic model. The control-feedback 
mechanism for availability contracts is based on the established affine control model 
shown in Figures 4 and 5 (Skaf and Boyd, 2010). The model aims to determine the 
optimal incentives/disincentives in an availability contract so that the customer can 
expect the best performance or availability given the long-term budget constraint 
while the contractor maintains a steady revenue (with profit). 
 
Figure 4. Affine Controller Model for Availability Contract  
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Figure 5. Affine Mechanism for Availability Contract 
The purpose of the optimization model is to: a) design the contractual terms, 
i.e., the Maximum Availability Payment (MAP) and the deductions; and b) simulate 
the two-layer problem (public request, private react). For the Public Sector we must 
design a set of Maximum Availability Payments (MAPs), and a deduction function 
(based on the performance) so as to make sure the project is within budget and 
incentivize the private sector to provide the best performance. The Private Sector, 
given the MAPs and the deduction matrix, must decide their strategies throughout 
the operation phase, such as: quality of the construction, O&M plan, and service 
quality, so as to maximize their profit and minimize their risk. 
The following model describes the general form of the optimization process of 
an availability-based PPP contract: 
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                                                                       (1) 
subject to  
𝑀𝐴𝑃𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦𝑡) ≤ 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡(𝑡), 𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇 
Where 𝑦𝑡∗ solves problems (𝑡 = 1, …𝑇: ), 
max��




𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦𝑡) − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝜂𝑀𝐴𝑃𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇 
where 𝑦𝑡  is the availability of the project at each time period 𝑡 (which comes 
from the DES and must be within the feasible domain for the system model); i is the 
discount rate (more generally the weighted cost of capital); T is the number of 
assessments during the contract time;4 𝜂 is a bankruptcy constraint; and 𝑀𝐴𝑃𝑡  and 
Deduction(∙) are decision variables for contract design for the level one (public 
sector) problem. Given the detailed contract, the private sector (level two) must 
decide on the best 𝑦𝑡? for each time 𝑡 to optimize its overall profit. 
In PPP contracts and models, 𝑦 represents the condition of the road, which 
comes from a linear model that is accounting for deterioration in terms of 
disturbance (Sharma et al., 2010). Road deterioration dynamics are captured with 
linear models and generally have slow dynamics and smooth behavior. PPP 
contracts are long and the effect of the transient behavior of the system can be 
ignored. However, PBL contracts for mission critical systems are dealing with 
systems with non-linear behavior and a variety of internal dynamics. In PBL, 
systems failures cause discontinuities in the behavior and the deterioration of the 
system, which come from many different parts whose reliability are modeled in the 
DES (Petri net). 
Design space explorations using a variety of search methods and 
optimization methods is a common approach in contract-based designs (Nuzzo et 
al., 2014). In our method every decision or solution needs to be checked for 
feasibility of physical system realization. 
4 The operational time during the contract is divided into equal independent periods for performance 
measurement. At the end of each period (time window), an assessment will be done on the level of 
performance of the contractor. The outcome in each of these periods will determine the payment. 
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The first level, the contract design from the public sector’s perspective, seeks 
to maintain the best availability of the system given the long-term budget constraints. 
The first level problem is solved based on the recourse solution of the second level 
optimization, which represents the private sector’s behavior during the system 
operation. For the second-level problem, the main objective is to maximize profit, 
which depends on the operational strategy and contract terms such as the 
Maximum Availability Payments (MAPs) and deduction adjustments. 
Analysis Results 
A model that supports contract design negotiations can help both parties to 
identify the effect of each contract term and requirement on the possible result of 
the contract (Wijk et al., 2011). Among the stochastic factors that need to be 
included in this model are the ranges of actions the contractor can take in response 
to incentives. Also, as previously identified, the availability assessment time window 
(T) is an important factor. We assumed that the contractor can be modeled by an 
optimum affine controller. This controller represents the behavior of the decision 
maker using the historical data and minimizing risk and cost for future assessment 
windows. It should be noted that the controller we used is proven to be optimum for 
a given T for such systems (Skaf and Boyd, 2010), however it is not clear what the 
best T is for providing an overall performance optimum. We assume that if the 
controller will satisfy the availability requirements the cost is also important to the 
customer. “Cost” refers to the cost of the inventory (procurement of parts, handling 
costs, and cost of money). 
It has been observed that the contractor is concerned about the risk at each 
decision instance. So we need to be able to trade-off the optimum T for the 
customer and the contractor. Intuitively it is more beneficial to the contractor to 
receive a larger T because: 1) more information is better, 2) less noise effect will be 
present, and 3) there is more time to compensate for problems. However, the 
customer wants less variability and more preparedness. 
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Figure 6. Cost Per Year Using Various Time-Assessment Windows in the 
Controller 
 
Figure 7. Variance of Inventory Level 
In the model described in this report we are using the affine controller to 
optimize the availability in an indirect way. We can extend the controller to directly 
target availability, however in practice the most important control variables for 
contractors for maintaining availability are supply chain, and inventory 
management and reliability parameters. An availability model can be created as a 
meta-model based on these control parameters. In our analysis we assumed that 
reliability (and thereby demand) is not a control parameter, however in reality 
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PBL is designed to incentivize OEMs to improve their reliability (Guajardo et al., 
2012) and the effect could be captured in the model (but is not today).   
Figure 6 shows, total cost per period versus the availability assessment  
window  length.  The availability assessment window length is related to T by the 
following, 
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ =  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 (𝑇) 
Using the proposed affine controller scheme for controlling the availability we 
observed: 1) there is a globally optimum assessment window length for assessing 
the contractor through the contract length. An assessment window that is larger or 
smaller than this optimum will not benefit the contractor or the customer. 
However the cost vs. assessment window length relation (Figure 6) is not 
symmetrical around the optimum point and adding more time to the assessment 
window has less effect than reducing the time (i.e., assessing more often). 
Figure 7 shows that by increasing the time-assessment window size, the 
variability in the performance of the controller will decrease, which is due to 
access to more information that results in better modeling and the effect of 
sensitivity to small changes in demand. Figure 7 also shows that if the contractor 
looks at variance as a determining objective, the previous optimum might not be 
chosen and depending on the risk-taking attitude of contractor or customer the 
optimum point can be changed. This curve shows that a more regular assessment 
will result in less variability. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this report we have established a stochastic model that could be used to 
design the detailed terms in availability contracts; and created a methodology that 
extends PPP modeling to PBL contract design. Special attention has been paid to 
exploring the control mechanism between the public and private sector in 
availability contracts. The methodology combines a dynamic modeling strategy 
(affine controller) and event-based system (Petri-net model) to capture the 
complexity of the problem. 
The affine-controller mechanism is the key to balance the conflicting 
objectives of different parties in availability contracts. During the contract period, 
the private sector tries to maximize their total long-term profit based on the given 
contract terms and their own sustainment strategies. Alternatively, the public 
sector is trying to incentivize the private party to maintain the specified performance 
level. 
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The model aims to provide guidance for better design and negotiation of 
availability contracts, and is expected to help both parties understand the essential 
purpose of the partnership, and seek their mutual interest more efficiently. 
Specifically the model could be used to find the optimum time windows for 
assessing the contractor’s efforts (i.e., measuring availability) - this is a key factor 
that determines the constraints for a contractor’s design process and requires 
determining the length of the time window and the starting point for the first 
assessment. Longer assessment and sampling windows cause more fluctuation 
to appear in the middle time periods, but the prediction of demand will be more 
accurate. The length of the assessment window translates directly to the length 
of time over which availability is measured for contract assessment purposes. 
Figure 8 shows the effect of assessment window length on an indirect 
performance measure (i.e., inventory level). It shows that in all cases of 
assessment window length, the mean of inventory level is positive and the same, 
however the variance of inventory level is higher with longer assessment windows. 
This also shows that with the proper construction of the affine controller, indirect 
parameters also will be satisfactory. This variance can represent the situation 
where contractors take higher risk. A risk-averse contractor will prefer a smaller 
assessment window due to its lower variability. 
 
Figure 8. Inventory Level vs. Assessment Window Length  
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